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Abstract 
 
This article deals with the English translations of the adverb oikeiôs in Aristotle's texts. In chapter 
7 of the Categories, Aristotle advises speakers to create words if necessary (7a5-7), on the condi-
tion that the new word is given oikeiôs. However, the English translations does not render in an 
accurate way what Aristotle wants to express regarding name-giving, since the adverb oikeiôs, 
deriving from the adjective oikeios, denotes 'property' and 'familiarity', the second meaning obvi-
ously originating from the first. Oikeiôs is crucial for us to comprehend Aristotle's concept of 
name-giving, since he combines it with forms of the verbs apodidômi ('to define') or legô, more 
than eight times in this particular chapter, where he is concerned with correct linguistic rendition. 
In sense of 'familiarity', oikeiôs sheds more light on the philosopher's semantic theory in On Inter-
pretation, helping us to understand exactly how Aristotle conceived of conventionality, i.e., com-
bined with familiarity. 
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1. Introduction 
The subject of this paper is the English translation of the adverb oikeiôs in Aristo-
tle's texts, as related to the creation of new terms, in contexts where more light can be 
shed on the philosopher's approaches to language. 
Oikeiôs is a word of Aristotle's current linguistic use, a derivative based on a very 
popular and productive stem in ancient Greek. However, by examining: i)the way it is 
contextualized in the philosopher's formulations on language and ii)the way it is applied 
by Aristotle when he suggests new terms himself, i.e., in the frame of his own lin guistic 
theory and practices, we can arrive at thought-provoking insights about his approach to 
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the very character of linguistic communication, an approach which is not given sufficient 
attention in contemporary English translations of οἰκείως.  
 For the purposes of this specific study, the methodological steps that are followed 
are:  
 Firstly, the etymological background and the semantic range of oikeiôs, as well 
asthe respective word family are dealt with, so that the linguistic history of the 
term is brought to the fore, since we are engaged in an issue of translation. 
 Secondly, the way that Aristotle uses the term in the entirety of his corpus is ex-
posed, in order to illustrate the philosopher's general contextualization of 
oikeiôs. Afterwards, we will specify Aristotle's linguistic theory and practice, so 
that the way the term is domesticated in Aristotle's philosophy of language and 
name-giving can be stressed. 
 The next step concerns the treatment of Aristotle's linguistic texts that comprise 
the term oikeiôs on behalf of Ammonius of Hermeias, the Neoplatonic commen-
tator of the 5th cent. AD. Ammonius was the Head of the respective School in 
Alexandria (see Sorabji 2004, Introduction, with the respective bibliog-
raphy)1and a brilliant expounder of Aristotle's linguistic views (Chriti 2011a and 
2011b), who can illuminate the way that the philosopher's texts could be consid-
ered, although such commentaries are not always studied when approaching Ar-
istotle's (and Plato's) philosophy.  
It is hoped that in the concluding remarks, the issues that arise when it comes to 
Aristotelian linguistics from the specific not accurate rendition in English are evident. 
Furthermore, the terms in which this particular discussion is framed, could afford schol-
arship an idea of how important it is to take into account all the above or similar parame-
ters when translating the writings of an ancient thinker.  
 
2. Oikeiôs in Ancient Greek texts and in Aristotle's use 
The adverb oikeiôs derives from the adjective oikeios, which derives from noun 
oikos (Foikos in dialectal form). This noun designates 'the place where someone lives', 
the 'house', the 'homeland' and also the 'patrimony'. It has given numerous derivatives, as 
                                                        
1In general, the School of Alexandria did not have crucial differences with the School of Athens as 
regards their method and orientation. 
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it is attested already in Mycenaean texts, as well as many compounds (Chantraine 1970, 
777).2 
 The initial semantic content of the word family deriving from oik-has to do with 
the concepts of 'home', 'origin', 'relation/closeness', as is also certified by ancient Greek 
dictionaries: the adjective oikeios primarily denotes something/someone belonging to a 
home or to a household, then a person who is affiliated with a family,i.e., a relative (e.g., 
Plato, Prot. 316c), then someone friendly, also 'private/one's own' and 'proper, fitting', 
obviously this last sense of 'compatibility' originating from 'affinity' (LSJ s.v.).It has to be 
stressed here that, as texts in which it occurs as 'proper' are cited by LSJ only Herodotus 
and Demosthenes, while in the texts of Plato and Aristotle the adjective is interpreted as 
"belonging to, conformable to the nature of a thing". Aristotle is also referred to in the 
phrase "οἰκεῖον ὄνομα" (Rhetoric,1404b35), where the adjective has the meaning of 'lit-
eral', in opposition to 'metaphorical', a case where 'affinity' and 'closeness' to reality re-
garding linguistic use is highlighted (see Membrez 2019, concerning the role of oikeion 
onoma in Aristotle's theory on metaphor and especially pp. 216-217 and 221). 
 Adverb οἰκείως is defined as having the same meanings; in the sense of 'appropri-
ateness' there is not a single philosophical text which is given as an example, while Aris-
totle's Categories 7a16 is the text given for the sense of 'being on familiar terms', a text 
which is discussed in detail below. According to Index Aristotelicus by H. Bonitz (1955, 
499) Aristotle uses the adjective more than forty times in his treatises with the sense of 
'familiar/known' and fewer with the sense of 'literal'. He also uses the adverb twelve 
times with the meaning of 'in a familiar way' ("γνωριμότερον", i.e., "better known" is 
given as a synonym). What is striking, however, is the fact that οἰκείως is only cited by 
Aristotle in formulations that regard linguistic use: therefore, he selects this specific ad-
verb to accompany verbs or verbal phrases such as "ἀποδίδωμι", "λέγω", "ἔχω τοὺς 
λόγους", "προσαγορεύω". This is why it is necessary to give a brief account of his lin-
guistic views in general, before delving into Aristotle's linguistic formulations with 
οἰκείως. 
 
3. Aristotle's linguistic approaches and practices andoikeiôs 
Aristotle's linguistic positions and practices have had a tremendous impact on the 
history of linguistic ideas (see, e.g., in a selective citation, Benveniste 1966, 63–65; 
                                                        
2Many of the derivatives and compounds survive in Modern Greek as οικιακός, οικοδεσπότης, 
οικοδομή, αποικία, etc.  
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Schofield andNussbaum 1982, 241–266; Weidemann 1991; Manetti 1996, 11–12; Ax 
2000, 59–60; Arens 2000; Chriti 2018).3The beginning of On Interpretation, i.e., 16a4-9, 
the so called semantic text/passage,4reflects the philosopher's linguistic theory in a con-
cise way. According to Aristotle, the articulated human vocal sounds render the concep-
tual entities that are formed in our minds after the sensory perception.5Aristotle treats two 
semantic stages, the first one relating vocal sounds with mental states, and the second 
connecting the latter with experiential data. These three factors in Aristotle's text have 
received sufficient attention from linguists, psychologists, logicians, and scholars from 
other disciplines. 'Things' (pragmata; for the semantic content of the term pragmata as 
'objects', 'deeds', 'affairs' etc. see On the Soul, 432a3; Meteorology, 379a32; Physics, 
226b30 and 227b28; Topics, 146a3; Sophistical Refutations, 175a8; Physics, 263a17; 
Prior Analytics, 70a32; Politics, 1299b18) are perceived by means of the senses. The 
'affections of the soul' are the figurative mental states of the soul6 which emerge after 
sensory perception and before linguistic expression,7they are called the likenesses (ho-
moiômata) of things and are also the same for all human beings. Vocal sounds render 
things and are connected to the affections in a conventional way. In general terms, Aristo-
tle's position is that things are expressed through mental states which are represented in 
language by meaningful vocal sounds (ta en têi phônêi) which are not the same for all 
people.8 
 However, convention is not identified with total arbitrariness for Aristotle, as it 
can be drawn from what he says a little below in the same treatise. In 16a 26-28 Aristotle 
                                                        
3Aristotle discusses all aspects of language: a) physiology of voice in his biological treatises, b) se-
mantics, c) predication (On Interpretation, Analytics, Topics), d) the units constituting words and 
clauses (On Interpretation, Poetics, Rhetoric), e) the potential of linguistic expression for argumenta-
tion, persuasion, deceit and pleasure (Poetics, Rhetoric, Sophistical Refutations), f) utterances desig-
nating classifications/taxonomies (Categories, Metaphysics).         
4 This specific passage is called as such in the present study. 
5Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken 
sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what 
these are signs of the primordial affections of the soul are the same for all; and what these affections 
are likenesses of – actual things – are also the same (adapted trans. J. L. Ackrill). 
6 Due to the fact that I do not find the identification of these affections with 'thoughts' convincing for 
reasons that are explained in Chriti 2018, I prefer to refer to them as mental products/states/entities. 
7 They are either the first meanings formed by the figurative impressions of things, or concepts as 
results of thinking in general (or both). 
8 The fourth term, 'those that are written', ta graphomena, renders the graphic representations of spo-
ken sounds. 
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states that a use of a word becomes symbolic as soon as it is agreed upon by the members 
of a linguistic community. Therefore, his belief in convention is not identical with Her-
mogenes' extreme conventionalism in Plato's Cratylus (for an overall discussion of the 
comparison between the Cratylus and Aristotle see Chriti 2018 with the respective bibli-
ography),as Aristotle declares that the symbolic use of a word needs to have the consent 
of the members of a linguistic community:  
τὸ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην, ὅτι φύσει τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν γένηται 
σύμβολον… 
"by convention" was introduced because nothing is by nature a noun or name — it 
is only so when it becomes a symbol… (trans. by E. M. Edghill).  
Consequently, he does not claim that any person can impose any name, but that an utter-
ance has to be accepted as symbolic by the speakers. This means that convention has the 
sense of 'agreement' for Aristotle for the sake of human communication. The limits to 
convention are defined by the role of a symbol as a token, for the representation of which 
the speakers agree on accepting one and the same codification, a codification in which 
οἰκείως plays a crucial role, as it is evident right below in this article.  
 The significance of mutual consent as regards linguistic use can be cross-checked 
by the Categories, a treatise that has not received sufficient attention when it comes to 
the philosopher's approaches to language. In the CategoriesAristotle advises speakers to 
create names under certain conditions. The advice itself is totally compatible with believ-
ing in the conventional character of language: hadn't Aristotle claimed that language is a 
product of human convention, he wouldn't have encouraged speakers to create words. But 
how should mankind apply new utterances? In the Categories Aristotle describes the way 
that human beings should apply names to things and, more specifically, in chapter 7, 
which is cited by LSJ for the term oikeiôs and where Aristotle treats reciprocation ("πρός 
τι"), he embarks on the issue of its linguistic representation, by admitting that sometimes 
a linguistic expression is not possible by using the current vocabulary and, at the same 
time, by advising speakers to create words if necessary (Categories, 7a5-7; see also Ni-
comahean Ethics,1108a17‒19; Aristotle's advice is also discussed by Kotzia 2007a, 
1092):  
ἐνίοτε καὶ ὀνοματοποιεῖν ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον, ἐὰν μὴ κείμενον ᾖ ὄνομα πρὸς ὃ οἰκείως 
ἂν ἀποδοθείη 
It may sometimes be necessary even to invent names, if no name exists in relation to 
which a thing would be given properly [οἰκείως](Trans. by J. L. Ackrill). 
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It should be primarily pointed out that we are dealing with the first occurrence of 
the verb ὀνοματοποιεῖν 'to create a name', a verb which is here accompanied by the ad-
verb oikeiôs. Aristotle suggests that we should invent names for unnamed subjects, on the 
condition that the new term is given oikeiôs. Let us try to investigate how the philosopher 
conceives of the relation between linguistic rendition and oikeiôs, given: i) the range of 
the word's semantic content itself and more specifically in Aristotle as presented above 
and ii) the principle lines of his linguistic formulations, since it is in a linguistic context 
that oikeiôs occurs. Unfortunately these two factors have not been taken seriously into 
account in the English translations of the adverb as "properly". In the edition of the Loeb 
Classical Library, H. P. Cooke (1967) translates as "in correlation / correlative terms" 
(used also by Ackrill a little below, in his translation of7a5-7), which does not seem very 
accurate either, but is better understood in comparison to "properly", since it is combined 
with "exactness", rendering the character of the suggested correlation more clear: "exact-
ness" refers to linguistic affinity, which is close to the sense of 'familiarity' that Aristotle 
wants to emphasize with oikeiôs. (In their excellent edition with a French translation of 
the Categories, F. Ildefonse and J. Lallot also preferred to use the term "approprié": 
"…Parfois, il est peut-être nécessaire de forger un mot, si il n'existe pas de mot dispo-
nible qui fournisse une réponse appropriée à la question du relatif… "; 2002, 87). 
Let us return to the Greek text: the importance of oikeiôs is evident by the fact that 
Aristotle combines it with forms which are semantically close to ὀνοματοποιεῖν more 
than eight times in this particular chapter, where he is concerned with correct linguistic 
rendition (see right below; see also Nicomachean Ethics, 1119b33; Physics, 195b3). First 
of all, it can be said that according to Aristotle's advice, the concept of 'appropriateness' 
is the wished result and not a presupposition when it comes to establishing a new term: in 
the text of the Categories, the advice including oikeiôs is given as a condition, as a guide-
line, as something prior to any kind of 'appropriateness'. This condition can't be anything 
else than the 'affinity' of the newly suggested utterance with the speakers' current linguis-
tic use, a relation that can render the new convention familiar and not strange, a proximi-
ty that results in an appropriate new utterance. Thus, right after his advice, Aristotle 
states that there is no reciprocation if it is not given oikeiôs in language by saying that "a 
rudder is rudder of (or somehow else related to) a ruddered" and that "a head would be 
given oikeioteron (and this is the exact text given by the LSJ for the meaning 'being on 
familiar terms') as of a headed than as of an animal, because it is not as being an animal 
that a thing has a head…" (Categories, 7a8-17). 
And Aristotle concludes (Categories, 7a18-20): 
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οὕτω δὲ ῥᾶστα ἂν ἴσως τις λαμβάνοι οἷς μὴ κεῖται ὀνόματα, εἰ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων καὶ 
τοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ ἀντιστρέφουσι τιθείη τὰ ὀνόματα,… 
This is perhaps the easiest way to lay hold of things for which there are no estab-
lished names – if names derived from the original relatives are assigned to their re-
ciprocating correlatives… (trans. J. L. Ackrill).  
Reciprocation is not valid if not expressed as it should be, and members of a linguistic 
community should always invent familiar names, i.e., names that designate an actual 
relation in terms of reciprocation. Aristotle explains how a conventional 'agreement' can 
be done oikeiôs, when he encourages speakers to use "derivation from the original rela-
tives", as it is formulated in this text. Eventually, established linguistic material should be 
used in name-giving, a material that the speakers are familiar with. Judging from his 
treatment of reciprocation in the examples of the rudder and the head, this familiar lin-
guistic deposit that designates known concepts can be used to express the new meanings 
that are related to the named ones. In other words, an affinity between things can be des-
ignated by an affinity between utterances, which means that familiarity between words is 
necessary when rendering related things.  
 Especially helpful concerning the importance of linguistic familiarity that corre-
sponds to a conceptual proximity in name-giving is a text which is completely irrelevant 
to logic or linguistics. In the Meteorology Aristotle again uses the term oikeiôs to approve 
of a specific linguistic use in his mother tongue (Meteorology, 347a10-12): 
οἰκείως τὰ ὀνόματα τοῖς πάθεσιν κεῖται καί τισιν διαφοραῖς αὐτῶν∙ ὅταν μὲν γὰρ 
κατὰ μικρὰ φέρηται, ψακάδες, ὅταν δὲ κατὰ μείζω μόρια, ὑετὸς καλεῖται. 
The text is translated as follows in the Loeb series: 
And there are appropriate names for these processes and for some of their sub-
species — for instance when water falls in small drops it is called drizzle, when in 
large drops, rain(Transl. by H. D. P. Lee) 
 Again oikeiôs is not translated as familiar but as appropriate, a synonym of prop-
er. However, in the text from the Meteorology, the only way of treating Aristotle's attrib-
ution of oikeiôs to the use of the terms psakades and huetos is their close linguistic rela-
tion with current linguistic material, i.e., their verbal proximity with other linguistic ut-
terances in use: the form psekas means 'drop of rain' and is etymologically related to the 
verb psakazô ('to rain in small drops'), while the form huetos means 'rain' and derives 
from the verb huô ('to rain'). Eventually, these nouns have been attributed oikeiôs to the 
particular physical phenomena, because they are linguistically related to the verbs that 
designate the processes resulting in these phenomena. Meanwhile, in the French transla-
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tion of Belles Lettres by P. Louis, this specific text from the Meteorology is rendered as: 
"Des noms particuliers ont été donnés à ces phenomènes…" (1982):here it is apparent 
that the new names cannot be random, but again familiarity is not highlighted.  
 It should be pointed out that Aristotle does not seem to care about the grammatical 
forms of the words that he approves of, but he emphasizes the attribution of names as 
related to established utterances. Consequently, oikeiôs in language means for Aristotle 
using a word which is verbally close to established utterances with which speakers desig-
nate contents relative to the one that needs to be named.  
 
4. Aristotle's Familiar Suggested Terms 
The way that Aristotle conceives of the importance of 'familiarity' in linguistic use 
is evident even in his own suggestion of new terms, one of his indisputable contributions 
to the history of philosophy. (Generally speaking, ancient Greek philosophical vocabu-
lary is an innovation as a whole, since it emerged gradually and alongside with ancient 
Greek philosophical reflection; see the bibliography given by Kotzia 2007a. Ancient 
commentators had stressed the attribution of names on behalf of the philosophers: see, 
e.g., Porphyry in his commentary on Aristotle's Categories, 55.12‒24 and Dexippus in 
his commentary on the same treatise, 6.10‒23). 
Aristotle's linguistic choices have raised discussions ever since antiquity. He sug-
gests terms for what he treats very often and scholarship owes him the systematization of 
terminology in several disciplinary fields, such as biology, ethics, physics etc. (see, e.g., 
Swiggers and Wouters 2002, 9-10, regarding linguistic concepts and terms). He states 
that his current vocabulary is insufficient for what he wishes to investigate by using a 
word with a notion of his own for this very purpose: anônumos ('without name'; more 
than seventy times in his texts, the specific term is used by Aristotle to denote the lack of 
terms in linguistic treatment: see, e.g., On the Soul, 418a1, 419a4, 419a32; Nichomache-
an Ethics, 1107b2, 1108a17; On the History of Animals, 490b19, 515b10; Poetics, 
1447b9, etc. In some cases he declares that "there is no established name": onoma gar ou 
keitai; Categories 7a13). Contemporary scholars like D. Bostock (1994, XI),J. Barnes 
(1981, 42) and A. Bäck (2000, 130) have spoken of Aristotle's unusual language, while 
eminent scholars have studied significant aspects of the philosopher's semantic practices 
(see, e.g., Bäck 2000), as well as the interconnection between Aristotle's semantics and 
ontology in the context of his argumentative strategies (see De Rijk 2002; Bäck 2000 and 
2014).  
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However, to what extent can scholarship talk about "unusual/strange" new terms 
in Aristotle's linguistic practices, given that he is never distanced from already used ut-
terances? Aristotle always stays faithful to the importance of conceptual and verbal prox-
imities for the production of new terms and their acceptance by the receivers: as is obvi-
ous in the examples below, conceptual relevance between the new meaning and the al-
ready named one leads him to a proposal of a familiar term in his linguistic suggestions, 
on the basis of his current linguistic material (for a detailed survey of this very practice 
see Chriti 2018).Thus, e.g., in the case of schêma which is a commonly used word, the 
new concept that emerges from Aristotle's research and does not have a name in current 
linguistic usage is the 'figure of a syllogism'. Aristotle resorts to a relative concept, which 
is 'form, figure' and already has a name in his mother tongue, schêma. So, here-attributes 
the word to the new unnamed meaning: thus, the word schêma is usedfor the first time by 
Aristotle with the meaning 'figure of a syllogism'.  
Aristotle's linguistic suggestion departs from the concept in question; he uses a 
relative concept that already has a name, and, it is on the basis of this specific name that 
he suggests a new term. As long as the current word is related to a new sense,i.e., a sense 
that has not yet been named and established in use, the reattributed word can be consid-
ered as a new term. Even in the case of his famous entelecheia, Aristotle doesn't do any-
thing different, since he exploits the existent words en, telos, echô, along with their se-
mantic contents in his current linguistic practice, so as to coin entelecheia absolutely 
oikeiôs: the new concept that he wants to name is: 'inner power guiding to a goal', the 
relevant concepts, the names of which he has at his disposal are 'in', 'goal', 'to have', des-
ignated by the respective vocabulary.  
Under no circumstances does Aristotle use an utterance which has nothing to do 
with his contemporary vocabulary, a vocabulary that designates concepts related to what 
he wants to name: whether he suggests a common Greek word, or he creates a derivative, 
or coins a neologism etc., it is by resorting to the deposit of his mother tongue's vocabu-
lary that he proposes terms. The named concepts are those that supply the philosopher 
with the linguistic material, so as to pick a familiar word or to coin a new— but always 
familiar — one: for Aristotle, name-assigning ends up with an evident verbal proximity 
between a used utterance and the newly suggested one, i.e., the result is always familiar. 
Therefore, no term is attributed as a solution in an arbitrary way, because Aristotle is 
obviously concerned with verbal proximities for the sake of familiarity in linguistic 
communication. The philosopher is interested in rendering his linguistic suggestions 
accessible and acceptable by the members of his linguistic community, so that they can 
agree on adopting the specific conventions and integrating them in their usage.  
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5. Aristotle's oikeiôs interpreted as 'familiarly' by Ammonius of Hermeias 
Aristotle's Neoplatonic commentator Ammonius son of Hermeias discusses the way that 
the philosopher uses oikeiôs in his commentary on On Interpretation. Ammonius treats 
Aristotle's linguistic behavior in the light of the two Neoplatonic commentatory princi-
ples, i.e., the "principle of agreement" (see Karamanolis 2006)9 between Plato and Aristo-
tle (the particular tendency goes back to Aristotle's immediate circle: see Kotzia 2007b, 
194‒201)and the principle "explaining Aristotle from Aristotle".10Ammonius is a distinc-
tive case of a Neoplatonic commentator with interests in language (see Chriti 2011a 
and2011b) and the only one — to our knowledge — who attempts to reconcile Plato and 
Aristotle (as Sorabji stresses, Porphyry and Ammonius were mostly focused on the 
agreement between Plato and Aristotle in general: 2004, 14) in the field of linguistic 
views (see also Kotzia and Chriti 2014).The commentator claims that Aristotle funda-
mentally agrees with Plato in terms of language, Plato's views being expressed by Socra-
tes in the Cratylus;11 Socrates mediates the two extreme positions of his interlocutors, 
i.e., the absolute "naturalism" held by Cratylus and the absolute "conventionalism", sup-
ported by Hermogenes: Ammonius believes that Aristotle is in harmony with what Plato 
expresses through Socrates,12 i.e., a wise reconciliation of the two contrasted opinions 
held in the dialogue.  
 To prove that Aristotle does not oppose to Socrates, Ammonius does not have to 
delve into Aristotle's refutation of Cratylus' view, as the philosopher explicitly declares 
the conventional character of language. What Ammonius needs to do, is to certify that 
Aristotle does not adopt the attitude of Hermogenes either, so that it can be highlighted 
that Aristotle expresses Socrates' moderated stance. The commentator resorts to Aristo-
tle's texts to retrieve his examples, following the respective principle (see above): he 
declares that Aristotle expresses his opposition to Hermogenes' extremity in many cases 
                                                        
9 The specific principle was followed by the commentators in different degrees and the only ones who 
did not apply it were Themistius and, much later, Michael Psellos from the circle of Anna Comnene.  
10Cf. Aristarchus' doctrine “explaining Homer from Homer”. 
11Amm. On Int. 37.1‒5: ὁ τοίνυν ἐν τῷ Κρατύλῳ Σωκράτης διαιτῶν τῷ τε Κρατύλῳ καὶ τῷ 
Ἑρμογένει διαφερομένοις ἀπὸ διαμέτρου περὶ τοῦ φύσει εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα ἢ θέσει δείκνυσιν ὡς οὔτε 
οὕτως ἐστὶθέσει, ὡς Ἑρμογένης ἠξίου… οὔτε οὕτως φύσει. 
12Amm. On Int. 37.14‒18: Οὐδὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα διάφορον οὐδὲ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τούτοις 
διατάττεται λέγων οὐδὲν τῶν ὀνομάτων εἶναι φύσει … καθάπερ καὶ Πλάτων,… 
LABYRINTH Vol. 21, No. 2, Winter 2019 
 
 
98 
 
in his treatises, when the philosopher endeavors to indicate that names are "compatible 
with things"(Amm.,On Int. 37.18‒19):   
δηλοῖ δὲ τοῦτο [Ἀριστοτέλης] ἐν πολλαῖς τῶν πραγματειῶν ἑαυτοῦ, σύμφωνα 
δεικνύναι τοῖς πράγμασι τὰ ὀνόματα πειρώμενος,  
He[Aristotle] makes that clear in many of his treatises, where he attempts to show 
that names are consonant with things (Transl. D. Blank) 
 What does Ammonius mean by stating that Aristotle expresses his agreement 
with Socrates (and Plato) by using words that are "consonant with things"? (The adjective 
that he uses is σύμφωνα, which is translated as "consonant" by D. Blank in his edition of 
Ammonius' text). Which are the Aristotelian words that express Socrates' compromising 
policy? Before embarking on specific examples that Ammonius cites from Aristotle's 
writings, we can get an idea about the character of such utterances from the commenta-
tor's perspective, by cross-referring to his following statement in the same commentary 
(Amm., On Int.36.23‒25): 
τὰ γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀνοματοθέτου τιθέμενα ὡς μὲν οἰκείως ἔχοντα πρὸς τὰ πράγματα, 
οἷς κεῖνται, φύσει ἂν καλοῖντο 
This passage is translated by D. Blank as follows: 
For what is imposed by the name-giver as being appropriate (οἰκείως) to the things 
for which they stand would be called on the one hand by-nature. 
Oikeiôs in Ammonius' text is translated in English as "being appropriate", maybe follow-
ing the standardized English translations of Aristotle's text. Nevertheless, what is im-
portant here is that the content of oikeiôs in name-imposing is acknowledged by Ammo-
nius as "by-nature", i.e., in contrast to what Hermogenes sustains. The commentator ex-
plicates how he considers this specific adverb in his commentary on the Categories, relat-
ing οἰκείως to the concept of 'common habit/custom', by pointing out that, Aristotle ad-
vices us to assign names (ὀνοματοποιεῖν), if a name does not exist in our customary use 
(ἐν τῇ κοινῇ συνηθείᾳ: Amm., On Cat. 72.24‒25). 
 Consequently, as it can be concluded from Ammonius' writings in his commen-
taries on the Categories and on On Interpretation: a) οἰκείως denotes a practice which is 
subsequent to common linguistic habits and b)for this very reason the results of such 
practices can be considered "by-nature", obviously revealing that Aristotle does not adopt 
Hermogenes' extreme conventionalism. Ammonius recognizes as "familiar", "consonant 
with things" and not "arbitrary" some of Aristotle's "words" cited right above, including 
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the case of ἐντελέχεια, as well as the terms from the Meteorology, something which re-
veals how well Ammon ius has studied (Amm., On Int. 37.20‒24). 
...καθάπερ ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει τὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ὄνομα καὶ τὸ τοῦ κενοῦ, ἐν δὲ 
τοῖς Μετεώροις τὸ τῆς ψεκάδος καὶ τὸ τοῦ ὑετοῦ, καὶ ὅσα μέντοι τιθέντα αὐτὸν 
ὀνόματα ἴσμεν, ὡς τὸ τῆς ἐντελεχείας… ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τεθέντα σαφέστατα δηλοῖ τὴν 
περὶ τούτων τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοιαν.  
For example, in the Physics lecture, the name of 'spontaneity' and that of 'void', or 
in the Meteorology that of 'raindrop' and 'shower', as well as the names that we 
know that he posited, such as 'entelechy'…These names posited by him show very 
clearly what the Philosopher thought about these matters (transl. D. Blank)  
The commentator states for the above cases of Aristotle's terms that they show clearly 
what the philosopher thought about the character of language and Ammonius' explana-
tions of Aristotle's linguistic theory and practice can be completed by the commentator's 
treatment of Porphyry's Introduction, where he is also occupied with the necessity of 
suggesting "familiar names" (Amm., On Porph. 'Intr.' 50.19‒51.6): 
καὶ ἑκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν ὡς μέλλουσά τι καινότερον καὶ ξενοπρεπὲς παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας 
διδάσκειν τέχνας τοῖς οἰκείοις ὀργάνοις ὀνόματα ἐπιτίθησιν, ἵνα ἔχῃ πῶς αὐτὰ 
σαφηνίσει· οὕτως γὰρ οἱ γεωμέτραι πολλὰς διαφορὰς τριγώνων εὑρηκότες οἷον τὸ 
μὲν ἴσας ἔχοντὰς τρεῖς πλευρὰς τὸ δὲ τὰς δύο μόνον τὸ δὲ τὰς τρεῖς ἀνίσους, 
οἰκείοις ὀνόμασιν κεχρημένοι τὸ μὲν ἴσας ἔχοντὰς τρεῖς πλευρὰς ἐκάλεσαν 
ἰσόπλευρον, τὸ δὲ τὰς δύο μόνον ἴσας ἰσοσκελὲς τὸ δὲ τὰς τρεῖς ἀνίσους σκαληνόν, 
βουλόμενοι διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἕκαστον τούτων δηλῶσαι. οὕτως ἄρα τὰ ὀνόματα 
σημαίνει τὰ πράγματα.  
This text should be translated more or less as follows, where adjective οἰκεῖοςseems to 
mean 'proper', in the sense of 'one's own / familiar': 
And each art that aspires to teach something newer and not standard beside other 
arts, attributes names by means of its proper/familiar instruments (τοῖς οἰκείοις 
ὀργάνοις), so as to accomplish it with clarity; thus, the geometers,  who have found 
many different types of triangles, such as the one that has three equal sides, the oth-
er two and another with three unequal ones, have used familiar names (οἰκείοις 
ὀνόμασιν) and called the first equilateral, the second isosceles and the th ird scale-
nus, aiming at designating each with the respective name. 
Ammonius here underlines the need of "each art" to impose new names for unknown 
subjects, appellation swhich could seem strange to the listeners/learners. The specific 
necessity has to be dealt with by scholarships' own "tools", i.e., by the disposable means 
of each field, so that the new terms can be familiar to those who perceive them; distinc-
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tive is the case of geometers, Ammonius continues, who have named the diverse types of 
triangles according to their characteristics of sides.  
 It can be argued that the specific text expresses the co-existence of: a)the Platon-
ic/Socratic concept of 'art' (in the Cratylus, Socrates defines the techne which is followed 
by the name-giver: Crat. 389a2; 393d4; 389d4‒390a8; 390e1‒4; 387c1 and 6‒7; 
388c1),with the Socratic 'tool', an attribution to words when Socrates claims that a name 
functions as a "didactic tool" (ὄργανον διδασκαλικόν) and as an imitation (μίμημα) which 
is "by-nature", meaning that it fits the nature of what is named;13b) the latter Socratic 
concepts/terms with Aristotle's "οἰκείως". The result is a coherent narrative: Ammoniusis 
faithful to his view that the Aristotelian approach to language is not opposed to thePla-
tonic one as expounded by Socrates and this is why he combines linguistic concepts and 
terms which could be considered as separated. The outcome is that he applies for the first 
time such an interpretation of what it means to attribute new names by rendering verbal 
affinities as "tools" at the service of the art of naming exercised by geometers and other 
savants;14Ammonius explicitly says that familiarity is presupposed for clarity and every 
science should use its "familiar tools" in order to assign understandable names to new 
findings that have to be communicated. 
The invention of "new names", based upon already used utterances by Aristotle 
certifies for Ammonius that names are neither arbitrary nor random in Aristotle's own 
linguistic suggestions and thus the Neoplatonic commentator can reach the wished con-
clusion: the philosopher does not adopt Hermogenes' "total arbitrariness" as long as he is 
never distanced from familiar utterances, something that reveals his intention to suggest 
names that are consonant with things he needs to name. This kind of compatibility is 
interpreted by Ammonius as the rejection of the "by-nature" character of language on 
behalf of Aristotle and total arbitrariness is now proved to be ruled out by "Ammonian" 
Aristotle, who is in harmony with Plato because of this very reason. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
                                                        
13Crat. 388b13-c1: {Socr.} Ὄνομα ἄρα διδασκαλικόν τί ἐστιν ὄργανον καὶ διακριτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας 
ὥσπερ κερκὶς ὑφάσματος∙ …; 423b9-11: Ὄνομ' ἄρ' ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικε, μίμημα φωνῇ ἐκείνου ὃ μιμεῖται, 
καὶ ὀνομάζει ὁ μιμούμενος τῇ φωνῇ ὃ ἂν μιμεῖται 
14See also Ammonius' remark on the necessity of following a language 's structure and rules during 
word derivation, so that new words do not sound strange to native speakers: On Cat. 72.16 ff and 
73.8 ff.  
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Let us recapitulate, by saying, first of all, that the meaning of 'appropriateness' 
does not occur, neither for the adjective oikeios, nor for the adverb oikeiôs in philosophi-
cal texts when it comes to linguistic use. Two occurrences in Aristotle's texts given by 
LSJ have both adverb and adjective cited as designating 'proximity'. Of course it would 
not be unreasonable to argue that the concept of 'properness' could be considered as orig-
inating from 'familiarity' in the case of oikeios, since 'appropriate' is probably something 
or someone known and close to us, with which/whom we are familiar with. In English 
and French too, proper and proper respectively mean both 'private' and 'convenient/right', 
maybe because it feels proper/right to be with someone/something we know and are fa-
miliar with. 
This is also the case with Aristotle's advice to create new terms, and also with 
his suggestions and approval of certain linguistic usages: they are all appropriate, but 
they can be considered as such due to their origins from "home", which is the familiar 
environment of ancient Greek linguistic use. That is why the adverb oἰκείως as interpret-
ed and translated in Aristotle's texts needs careful reconsideration when it comes to the 
philosopher's linguistics, because its contextualization in his respective theory and prac-
tice remains decisive throughout his corpus. Aristotle's use of οἰκείωςin the entirety of his 
corpus always refers to the sense of 'familiarity' and there is no evidence to substantiate 
that he does something different in his linguistic texts, a view which can be reinforced by 
his linguistic practices, let alone the fact that he resorts to oikeiôs only when he refers to 
linguistic acts. Therefore, this specific adverb occurs side-by-side with verbs which des-
ignate naming very frequently in Aristotle's texts and this point seems to have gone virtu-
ally unnoticed regarding the English translations of οἰκείως.  
 Aristotle's use of oikeiôs is totally integrated in his philosophy of language, as it is 
expressed in both first two logical treatises. The philosopher is an adherent of the con-
ventional character of language, but he centers on the concept of 'agreement' between the 
members of a linguistic community; symbolic uses of words and familiarity have com-
plementary roles in human communication, according to Aristotle's theoretical formula-
tions. He sustains that words are products of agreement in mankind and human beings are 
absolutely authorized to suggest new names when they feel that they lack in utterances, 
but their proposed terms should be smoothly integrated in their current linguistic use.  
 The presupposition for this effective enrichment of vocabulary is familiarity: as long 
as newly coined utterances are introduced in a familiar way, i.e., not distanced from al-
ready used words, linguistic communication cannot be prohibited and appropriateness is 
the result, a point missed by the standardized Engl ish translations of the respective texts. 
As it is evident in On interpretation, the Categories and also the way that Aristotle ap-
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proves of a linguistic rendition in the Meteorology, he concerns himself with the issue of 
exploiting the linguistic deposit of his mother tongue and this is something that merits 
emphasis, since his concern is advanced in his writings as expressed by οἰκείως. Besides, 
being based on his mother tongue's material is what exactly Aristotle does in every single 
one of his hundreds linguistic suggestions in his treatises. Henceforth, translating οἰκείως 
as 'properly / in an appropriate way' may not seem misleading on first acquaintance, but 
on closer inspection it can be considered as divergent, regarding the significance of fa-
miliarity in Aristotle's positions and practices. 
 Verbal familiarity as exploited in total harmony with human habit is an issue deeply 
looked into by Ammonius of Hermeias in Aristotelian onomastics and, not only does the 
commentator approve of name-attribution supported by the disposable vocabulary, but he 
also theorizes it by contextualizing it into the discussion on the character of language. 
Thus, Aristotle's "οἰκείως"which refers to linguistic proximities, is interpreted as a refuta-
tion of Hermogenes' extreme conventionalism and these affinities are explicitly rendered 
by Ammonius as "tools" of disciplinary fields in name-assigning. 
 Ammonius is right: Aristotle does not support the absolute arbitrariness of Hermo-
genes in Plato's Cratylus, as it is revealed by his linguistic suggestions which could be 
familiar to and accessible by ancient Greek speakers, regardless of their degree of origi-
nality. The commentator indeed sheds light on the philosopher's conception of οἰκείως, 
independently of his attempt to reconcile Aristotle with Socrates/Plato, as he ought to, 
according to the tradition of his School in Alexandria: through the lenses of Ammonius, 
Aristotle is a thinker with specific tools in his hands, just like every technites and he has 
to apply these tools in his techne of philosophical research. His armory consists of the 
already established names that can be of assistance when he searches for ways to call 
what emerges in his inquiries.  
 Anyone could hardly disagree with the approach that language is the οἰκεῖον tool of 
philosophy. Ammonius has definitely a good point, since philosophy has been developed 
along with philosophical vocabulary by ancient Greek thinkers, who created terms origi-
nating from their everyday familiar language and were thus used οἰκείως. 
 
 
Dr. Maria Chriti, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, School of Modern Greek, 
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